What Pakistan's Current Elections teach us about Democratic Consolidation

           On March 17, 2013, for the first time in history, Pakistan’s democratically elected regime successfully completed its full constitutionally mandated five-year term. This marked a potentially game-changing milestone in Pakistani political history.  When they went to the polls on May 11, the Pakistani people are now participated in elections that mark the first potential democratic transition of power in the country’s history.  Throughout Pakistan’s 66-year history, it has oscillated between attempted democratic rule and military dictatorships.  Three previous attempts at an effective democratic transition of power have resulted in an assassination, a military coup, or both, and the imposition of martial law.  Institutionally, Pakistan has attempted create the framework for a successful transition for 40 years.  In1973, the Constitution was re-written in an attempt to preserve the democratic system while granting legitimacy and elevated (though regulated) power to the military, and formalized the parliamentary system.  Formal civil-military institutions, including chiefs of staff for each of the services and a join chief bureau, were created.  However, despite these reforms, a democratically elected government has not been able to hold or transition power without military intervention until the present regime.  Through the lens of Pakistan’s history, the current elections provide insight into the debate surrounding democratic consolidations. 

            Scholarly literature is yet to embrace a universally accepted definition of democratic consolidation.  The only agreed upon premise is that consolidation takes place after free and fair elections have occurred.  The classic definition, as described by Andreas Schedler, is a condition in which probability of a democracy’s breakdown is reduced to the “point where [one] can feel reasonably confident that democracy will persist in the near (and not-so near) future.”[1]  However, he cautions that this classical definition of consolidation may lead to an overly narrow a view of failure of consolidation.   While this definition allows for coups (military or civilian) to show a failure of consolidation, Schedler proposes the real danger for consolidating states is a more gradual backsliding, or erosion, of democracy, further developing Guillermo O’Donnell’s “slow death” of democracy.  His definition, therefore, sees consolidation as a spectrum moving away from democratic dissolution, towards advanced democracy.  Along this spectrum are four ideal types – authoritarian, electoral democracies, liberal democracies and advanced democracies[2].  Rather than offering concrete definitions of each, he is concerned with the political “horizon” each is looking towards.  He sees as “hopeful” those countries looking from electoral democracies towards liberal and advanced, and as “with concern” those looking the opposite direction.

            Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan consider a democratic regime to be consolidated when it meets certain behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional conditions.[3]  All three categories are predicated on actors’ belief that democratic institutions as the best way of achieving political aims, and adherence to established institutions.  They argue that consolidation is complete when civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus and economic society[4] favor democratic over nondemocratic institutions.  Though they recognize that a democracy can backslide at any time, the authors are primarily concerned with the mechanisms and institutions of the forward trajectories of consolidation, rather than possibilities of backsliding.    

            Schedler’s and Linz and Stepan’s definitions of consolidation both can be tested when applied to the case of Pakistan.  Pakistan’s history of consolidation attempts is full of both immediate and erosive backsliding.  Upon the dissolution of the British Empire’s holdings in Southeast Asia, Pakistan was founded on the principle of democratic rule.  However, it immediately began to fall victim to erosive tendencies.  As Pakistan struggled to gain international recognition, the external pressures of the Cold War international system strained the fledgling democratic institutions. This resulted in a military-led East-West division akin to Germany’s post Word War II partitioning, where elected officials held little, if any, power.  An attempt to unify the country under president Iskander Miza led the country along a democratically erosive trend. Mirza dismissed four elected prime ministers.  Violence erupted in response to his tactics, and he responded greater restrictions on the population, suspension of elections, and ultimately the imposition of martial law.  Ultimately, the military ousted Mirza in a bloodless coup and imposed dictatorial rule.  Pakistan’s initial experiment with democracy fits Schedler’s electoral democracy descriptor as a diminished democracy that “failed to uphold political and civil freedoms,”[5] and eroded into authoritarian rule.    

            This period of military rule (late 1950s – 1970s) was clearly a failure of democratic consolidation.  This period was characterized by the revocation of civil liberties, and marred by both intra- and inter-state wars, while maintaining the trappings of democratic institutions.  Two more democratic experiments (one left-leaning under Prime Minister Zulifkar Ali Bhutto in the mid 1970s and one right-leaning under Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the early 1990s) both declined into military dictatorships. In both instances, Pakistan was unable to deepen their democracy after the electoral phase, resulting in a continual backslide.

            The greatest hope for Pakistan’s consolidation towards a liberal democracy comes at present, as a democratically elected government as completed a term in office. First, a true multi-party system has been restored.  The government formed in 2008 was one built on consensus.  Political parties banned during periods of military rule have been restored. Previously exiled opposition leaders returned to the country.  In the current elections, over 47 parties have registered candidates on the ballet.  Second, institutions have been restored to their constitutionally guaranteed levels of power.  The judiciary has been restored as an independent, yet coequal, branch of government.  Civilian oversight of the military has been formalized.  Additionally, the president’s power to dissolve the parliament unilaterally was revoked. Civil liberties, including the right to protest freely, have largely been restored, and the parliament emphasizes its commitment to being “of and by the people.”  Throughout the whole of Pakistan’s history, the current regime is on the most positive democratic trajectory.   

            Linz and Stepan’s consolidation conditions offer insight into Pakistan’s current regime.  In the current campaign cycle, all contenders for power appear to have acted within the democratic sphere.  There is yet to be an attempt at a non-democratic power grab, and the military has remained out of the political sphere.  Behaviorally, there is at least the appearance of democratic preference on the part of political actors.  Constitutionally, Pakistan appears to be favoring democracy as well.  Per the constitution, the parliament was dissolved without incident in order to call for elections, and a caretaker government was put in place.  Members of the previous military dictatorship have been impartially tried and persecuted for their actions under the law.  With few exceptions, both civilian and military leaders have accepted their standing under the constitution. 

            A measure of attitude, however, is more difficult and offers mixed results.  Pakistani newspapers such as the International Tribune, Khelaaj Times, and Pakistan Today have conducted numerous electoral polls.  These polls show diverse results – based on income, education level, ethnicity, gender and generation – that one would expect in an uncertain competitive democratic election.  Results from these polls all showed an election “too close to call,” generally positive indicator of successful democratic consolidation.  While such polls appeared to point to an attitudinal preference for working within the democratic system, they may have painted too rosy a picture of civil society.  Linz and Stepan assert that a “lively and independent civil society”[6] is necessary for democratic consolidation.  While political organization and differing opinions are certainly indicative of democratic consolidation, the opinion polls failed to capture the uptick in violence surrounding the political campaigns and dampening some of the civil society effects.  Over 50 people were killed while participating in campaign-related activities in the month of April.[7]  The Taliban has claimed responsibility for most of the deaths and violence.  While not a recognized political or civic entity, the Taliban’s ability to recruit and carry out extra-constitutional anti-democratic activities shows that there is still a portion of the population who does not believe that democracy is the best option.  The Taliban may prove to be the biggest challenge to Pakistan’s ability to consolidate.

            Are the Taliban-led actions enough to erode the otherwise positive indicators of rule of law, state apparatus and economics in both civil and political society?  Now that elections have been held, a few key indicators over the next several weeks may hold the answer.  First is the willingness of the incumbent party to peacefully relinquish power.[8]  The mechanics of a democratic transition have yet to be successful in Pakistan.  This will test both constitutional and behavioral adherence to the democratic principles of rule of law as a new ruling coalition with an ideological shift takes place.  Secondly, the military’s willingness to continue to adhere to civilian oversight will also embody a clear sign of success.  During previous attempts to hold democratic elections and consolidate a government, the military has stepped in to authoritatively fill the power vacuum.  Restraint in doing so this time is necessary for Pakistan to continue along a positive trajectory towards democratic consolidation.  Additionally, the willingness of civil society to accept the electoral outcome and use legal means to voice opposition will be a key indicator.  This last indicator will provide the most comprehensive behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional measures of the direction of civil society.  Accepting the results as valid and final will provide the attitudinal indicator, while voicing any opposition in a legal and organized way provides both behavioral and constitutional indicators of a preference for a democratic system.  A reversion to violent or extra-legal behavior, or a sharp rise in support for the Taliban would counter these tendencies. Such non-democratic behavior would be a sign of Pakistan eroding away from democratic consolidation. 

            At present, Pakistan is far from any ideal-type of consolidated democracy.  Its repeated history of erosion and backsliding may be evidence of Adam Przeworski, Michael Alverez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi’s assertion that attempting to study consolidated democracies provides us with nothing but an “empty set.”[9]  The current elections show a tendency towards enduring democratic rule, at least in the short term.  If it is to succeed, it will provide a new case study for paths to consolidation. In contrast, if history is to repeat itself, Pakistan will remain entrenched in the literature of eroding attempts at transition.      

           

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[1] Andreas Schedler. 1998. “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy 9(2): 91-107.

[2] Schedler, 1998. 

[3] Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

[4] Linz and Stepan, 1996.

[5] Schedler, 1998. 

[6] Linz and Stepan, 1996. 

[7] Staff Writer.  2013.  “Pre-Election Violence Continues in Pakistan.”  Al Jazeera Newswire.  April 29.  Access at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/04/2013429144211458515.html

[8] Schedler, 1998. 

[9] Przeworski, Adam; Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 1996. “What Makes Democracies Endure?,” Journal of Democracy, 7, pages 39-55.

Guest Blogging

So... it turns out I'm awful at writing my own blog.  But I've guest blogged recently for 

Tyler Hamilton Training

The Sisterhood Network 

Combat Apathy

The Pole Story

Oh yea... and I coauthored an op-ed we're looking to get placed.   

So clearly I write better and more frequently for others.  

What a guest blogger?  Hit me up!  

Cooperating Across Corps - Op Ed

Below is an op-ed that a classmate and I wrote.  We're looking to shop it around so please feel free to recommend places where it would be a good fit!

Cooperating Across Corps

During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. military was forced to learn entirely new tactics of engaging the enemy. In both countries, an extraordinary effort went towards winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi and Afghan peoples. These new tactics present an opportunity for rich and meaningful dialogue between members of two seemingly incompatible groups, the Peace Corps and Marine Corps.

The benefits of interaction are perhaps not immediately apparent – the Peace Corps and Marine Corps have distinct operational differences, and members of each frequently hold stereotypical views of the other. Peace Corps volunteers (PCVs) are often seen as idealistic, naïve hippies, and Marines as brash monsters, insensitive to the needs of communities in which they operate. Indeed, PCVs often joke that it takes $500 and a whole community to build a school, but requires $1 million and one pilot for the military to destroy it; while Marines snicker that PCVs aren’t tough enough to serve in the “real Corps.” 

These stereotypes, in combination with the geographic distance between where each organization operates, prevent any cross-agency dialogue that could be useful. However, the barriers to communication should not be so insurmountable, as PCVs and Marine Officers tend to have much in common. They are of similar age and have similar motivations – they forgo the paths of their peers to be representatives of the United States abroad in support of a ‘greater good.’ Given such similarities and the wealth of knowledge on both sides, the current vacuum of discussion is a missed opportunity.

Additionally, combat centered tactics are growing ever closer to those that are seen as traditionally Peace Corps. For example, in the latter years of the wars, small unit leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan are operating in remote villages, disconnected form their larger higher headquarters. In addition to stabilizing populations militarily, Marines find themselves conducting peace building operations—they are building schools and roads, facilitating agriculture programs and ensuring infrastructure functions properly. Living in and among the population, they are also exposed to daily interaction with the local civilians. Marines have adapted well to these new tactics, but do not have an institutional memory for such civilian peace operations – the Peace Corps does. Returned PCVs have spent time living in remote villages without much external support. The first-hand experiences of PCVs integrating into small villages cannot be duplicated in a tactics manual. Breaking down the information barriers and incorporating PCVs’ lessons learned has the potential for a positive tactical impact.  

Conversely, PCVs can also learn from the experience of Marines. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) has vast experience in operating humanitarian assistance / disaster relief efforts in areas that PCVs currently serve. Through these missions, and their experiences in more remote villages in Iraq and Afghanistan, Marines directly experience the consequences of negative stereotypes about Americans and what happens when such notions grow in intensity over time. These attitudes are just the kind that Peace Corps attempts to prevent. As ambassadors of American goodwill and culture, volunteers can often be the one and only American that people will ever meet. Lessons from Marines as to particular challenges in certain countries will help Peace Corps Volunteers preempt such misunderstandings. The cultural lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan could later prove valuable for future Peace Corps missions.

These organizations will never operate directly in the other's sphere. There are bright lines of separation that must be preserved in order for trust in volunteers and the combat safety of Marines to be maintained. However, a starting point for lessons learned could be feasibly implemented into the training programs for each group. Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS), the Captain career level course, provides a forum for a returned PCV to step in and engage in a dialogue on community integration and needs assessment. Similarly, Pre-Service Training (PST) for volunteers is an opportunity for all incoming volunteers to contextualize their upcoming experience into the long term.

This exchange of information may be slow, but it still remains worthwhile. Over time, the fruits of discussion could help two groups of Americans understand each other, do their jobs, and represent the United States better than before.

Kyleanne Hunter was a Marine Corps AH-1W attack pilot from 2002-2012 who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, Brian Ernst was a Peace Corps volunteer in Madagascar from 2008-2011.  They are both current SIE fellows at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at University of Denver. 

Empowerment through fear

I am a risk taker.  I flew attack helicopters for a living.  I ice climb, mountain climb, and race my bike at ridiculous speeds on ridiculous roads because it's fun and relaxing.  I've moved across the country on my own no less than half a dozen times.  I've led delegations of congressmen into less than friendly countries where I speak minimal, if any, of the language.  I've slept outside through everything mother nature can throw at me.  And I'm ok with killing spiders.

I do, however, have my limits.  And limits come for various reasons.  Sometimes I'm not feeling 100%, sometimes my head and my heart just aren't into it that day, somethings make the hair on the back of my neck bristle in that "maybe you should just walk away" kind of way.

Yesterday, one of the other Combat Apathy ambassadors sent me this story about some canyon rope swing adventure gone not-so-right.  Yes, everyone was fine and the end.  And perhaps everyone had fun.  But, as the author of the commentary suggests, risks are meant to be experienced at a personal pace.

While I agree with generally everything the author has to say, I feel that she comes short of one of the primary issues surrounding risk takers - the respect and acceptance of fear.  Risk takers are not unnecessarily or recklessly fearless.  Those people don't live long enough to become risk takers.  Risk takers understand fear, respect fear, and need fear.  If you're not afraid, you don't understand the significance of risk, nor are you living up to your potential.  

Learning how to channel and develop fear is the strongest weapon an individual can possess.  The author argues that when faced with risk, "empowerment comes from taking that step ourselves."  Yes, it does, but that statement doesn't give credence to the entire process of empowerment.  

Risk taking is empowering.  And, inclusive of that, fear is empowering.  Fear, when used correctly, leads to respect.   Respect leads to knowledge.  Knowledge leads to strength and overcoming.  

I have been in situations similar to that of the women in the video.  I've had partners call me a "fucking chick" for just wanting to chill out for an afternoon and play around on some 5.8s rather than trying to crush myself on the 5.10b trad route for the 30th time in a row.  I've had fellow pilots mock me for pulling myself off a flight when I wasn't sure of my physical state.  Teammates have bristled when I couldn't make a race.  Understanding our moment to moment shortcomings and respecting our fears is true empowerment.  The days I spent climbing easier routes, or resting my body and mind were not easy.  It takes more courage to break from the peer pressure and stand up to your fears than go with the flow and pretend they don't exist. 

So, I challenge you all to respect your fears and face them.  Learn from them.  And lead them to empower you.  And, when you're ready, jump off the cliff.      

Academic Sampling Part 2...

And second... a memo on some of the prevailing literature's implication for anti-terrorism strategies. 

External vs. Internal Strategies in Combating Terrorism

            How is a terrorist defeated?  This question has been at the heart of debates and arguments between policy makers, military strategists, and academics for decades.  In the United States, the search for an answer has intensified in the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001.  America has fought a Global War on Terror (GWOT); tactics have been dressed up in a neat little package and called “Hearts and Minds Counterinsurgency” . There have been covert actions and overt shows of good will, and studies conducted on why terrorism works and how it is destined to fail. Arguments have been presented on the semantics of one man’s freedom fighter being another man’s terrorist.  Andrew Kydd and Barbra Walters’ “The Strategy of Terrorism” and Max Abrams’ “What Terrorists Really Want” seem to be two dichotomous and irreconcilable works, arguing for different motivations and strategic rationalities for terrorist behaviors. From each, therefore, comes a different recommendation for defeating terrorism.  However, taken together, the arguments give a more complete picture of terrorist motivation, and a broader insight on how to counter it.

            In looking at counter terrorism, it is important to differentiate between external and internal strategies.  External strategies focus on the big picture motivation of organizations, their choice of strategies, and the groups they target.  Countries targeted by terrorist organizations primarily use such strategies.  They focus on how to defeat the actions of a mature and strategic organization, which often exist outside the attacked country’s borders.  Internal strategies focus on the individuals that are drawn to terrorist organizations.  These approaches  are most often successfully employed by states combating domestic organizations.  They focus on breaking an organization before it forms, or preventing an established organization from carrying out successful attacks.  In summary, external anti-terrorism policies are concerned with an organization’s ultimate strategic goals, while internal approaches are concerned with individuals and internal workings of the organization.     

            Kydd and Walters argue for the rational actor theory in explaining the strategic logic of terrorism as a means of conveying a costly signal to a stronger adversary.  They propose that the success of a costly signal is due to one of five principle strategic logics: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding.[1]  The authors paint a picture of terrorist organizations being political goal-seekers (primary desires being regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control and status quo maintenance.[2]), and these strategies being the means to their end.  Understanding these strategic logics can aid in developing external counter terrorism strategies, as they give insights into why terrorists do what they do, and whom they attack.  Following from Kydd and Walters, external strategies should be focused on political (including military) actions.  These include the hardening of targets, targeted retaliation, partial concessions and even peace treaties.  The “clear” and “hold” phases of the “clear-hold-build” strategies also fall into this category, as targeted states work to physically regain territory held by terrorist groups.  Non-kinetically, states can also work to minimize the psychological effect of terrorists’ actions on their population, rendering their strategic logics ineffective.  These outwardly focused strategies, however, only address half the problem of combating terrorism.        

            Looking to Abrams’ descriptions of terrorist groups gives insight to the other side of the issue.  Abrams uses the Natural Systems model to explain the social reasoning for individuals to join a terrorist organizations.  He focuses primarily on the social networks and personal interactions that attract individuals to organizations.  Abrams stresses that there is often a disconnect between the official goals of an organization and the social goals governing the behavior of its members.[3]  Abrams’ insights can aid in developing internal counter terrorism strategies.  The natural systems model provides a deeper understanding of the psychology of why groups form, and the makeup of the individuals that comprise them.  Abrams focuses on the individual terrorist as a “social solidarity seeker.”[4]  This separates the individual from the group in terms of motivation and driving goals.  The natural systems model centers on the fact that terrorist organizations appeal to certain types of people – the socially alienated, those with friends or relatives already active in the organization, and/or those looking to be part of a group.  It therefore follows, that targeting these individuals and preventing them from joining organizations is the baseline for internal strategies.  Where external strategies and conducted primarily by political/military means, internal strategies are more often conducted by law enforcement and domestic political officials.  Strategies combating the internal side of terrorism include rigorous law enforcement profiling of vulnerable groups, driving a wedge between group members by rewarding persons for their cooperation with the government or law enforcement. The development and cultivation of double agents also further divides terrorist group members.  Such actions work to undermine the very solidary potential members are seeking when they look to join an organization.  Though there is not one universal terrorist “personality type,” the insights from Abrams’ findings on terrorists as social solidary seekers help to better understand the types of individuals susceptible to joining an organization. His surmises give a reasonable starting point for law enforcement efforts.  This inside-out approach presents the possibility for organizations to be stopped before they gather enough resources or momentum to conduct a successful attack.

            A war on terror cannot be fought by military might alone.  Though an important piece of the puzzle, it will not be successful unless the ties that bind organizations are undermined and broken.  The most recent example of this is seen in the 2006 surge in Iraq.  The increase in military troops combined with the Awakening movement inside Iraq worked to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) both externally and internally.  While US and coalition troops were working to tactically remove known AQI leaders and deny the organization territory, the Awakening movement undermined AQI’s social and psychological hold on the population.    

As shown, neither external nor internal strategies offer a complete counter to terrorism.  Rather, a two-pronged coordinated approach has the best potential for success.  This requires transparent communication and coordination between multiple actors and organizations.  Domestically, law enforcement, national policy makers, and potentially National Guard – level militaries must integrate their actions.  For attacks originating from a foreign organization, it means coordination between the target government’s political and military branches and the host country’s domestic law enforcement.  The efforts of such coordinated approach will be more fruitful than an individual strategy taken alone.  To defeat terrorism, it is important to look at seemingly opposing arguments, and discover their complimentary possibilities. 

             

              

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[1] Kyd and Walter 2006.

[2] Kydd and Walter 2006.

[3] Abrams 2008.

[4] Abrams 2008.