On March 17, 2013, for the
first time in history, Pakistan’s democratically elected regime successfully
completed its full constitutionally mandated five-year term. This marked a
potentially game-changing milestone in Pakistani political history. When they went to the polls on May 11, the Pakistani
people are now participated in elections that mark the first potential
democratic transition of power in the country’s history. Throughout Pakistan’s 66-year history, it has
oscillated between attempted democratic rule and military dictatorships. Three previous attempts at an effective democratic
transition of power have resulted in an assassination, a military coup, or
both, and the imposition of martial law.
Institutionally, Pakistan has attempted create the framework for a
successful transition for 40 years. In1973,
the Constitution was re-written in an attempt to preserve the democratic system
while granting legitimacy and elevated (though regulated) power to the military,
and formalized the parliamentary system.
Formal civil-military institutions, including chiefs of staff for each
of the services and a join chief bureau, were created. However, despite these reforms, a
democratically elected government has not been able to hold or transition power
without military intervention until the present regime. Through the lens of Pakistan’s history, the current
elections provide insight into the debate surrounding democratic
consolidations.
Scholarly
literature is yet to embrace a universally accepted definition of democratic
consolidation. The only agreed upon
premise is that consolidation takes place after free and fair elections have
occurred. The classic definition, as
described by Andreas Schedler, is a condition in which probability of a
democracy’s breakdown is reduced to the “point where [one] can feel reasonably
confident that democracy will persist in the near (and not-so near) future.”[1] However, he cautions that this classical definition
of consolidation may lead to an overly narrow a view of failure of
consolidation. While this definition
allows for coups (military or civilian) to show a failure of consolidation,
Schedler proposes the real danger for consolidating states is a more gradual
backsliding, or erosion, of democracy, further developing Guillermo O’Donnell’s
“slow death” of democracy. His
definition, therefore, sees consolidation as a spectrum moving away from democratic
dissolution, towards advanced democracy.
Along this spectrum are four ideal types – authoritarian, electoral
democracies, liberal democracies and advanced democracies[2]. Rather than offering concrete definitions of
each, he is concerned with the political “horizon” each is looking
towards. He sees as “hopeful” those
countries looking from electoral democracies towards liberal and advanced, and
as “with concern” those looking the opposite direction.
Juan
Linz and Alfred Stepan consider a democratic regime to be consolidated when it
meets certain behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional conditions.[3] All three categories are predicated on actors’
belief that democratic institutions as the best way of achieving political
aims, and adherence to established institutions. They argue that consolidation is complete
when civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus and
economic society[4]
favor democratic over nondemocratic institutions. Though they recognize that a democracy can
backslide at any time, the authors are primarily concerned with the mechanisms and
institutions of the forward trajectories of consolidation, rather than
possibilities of backsliding.
Schedler’s
and Linz and Stepan’s definitions of consolidation both can be tested when
applied to the case of Pakistan. Pakistan’s
history of consolidation attempts is full of both immediate and erosive
backsliding. Upon the dissolution of the
British Empire’s holdings in Southeast Asia, Pakistan was founded on the principle
of democratic rule. However, it
immediately began to fall victim to erosive tendencies. As Pakistan struggled to gain international
recognition, the external pressures of the Cold War international system
strained the fledgling democratic institutions. This resulted in a military-led
East-West division akin to Germany’s post Word War II partitioning, where
elected officials held little, if any, power.
An attempt to unify the country under president Iskander Miza led the
country along a democratically erosive trend. Mirza dismissed four elected
prime ministers. Violence erupted in
response to his tactics, and he responded greater restrictions on the population,
suspension of elections, and ultimately the imposition of martial law. Ultimately, the military ousted Mirza in a
bloodless coup and imposed dictatorial rule.
Pakistan’s initial experiment with democracy fits Schedler’s electoral
democracy descriptor as a diminished democracy that “failed to uphold political
and civil freedoms,”[5]
and eroded into authoritarian rule.
This
period of military rule (late 1950s – 1970s) was clearly a failure of
democratic consolidation. This period
was characterized by the revocation of civil liberties, and marred by both
intra- and inter-state wars, while maintaining the trappings of democratic
institutions. Two more democratic
experiments (one left-leaning under Prime Minister Zulifkar Ali Bhutto in the
mid 1970s and one right-leaning under Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz
Sharif in the early 1990s) both declined into military dictatorships. In both
instances, Pakistan was unable to deepen their democracy after the electoral
phase, resulting in a continual backslide.
The
greatest hope for Pakistan’s consolidation towards a liberal democracy comes at
present, as a democratically elected government as completed a term in office. First,
a true multi-party system has been restored. The government formed in 2008 was one built on
consensus. Political parties banned
during periods of military rule have been restored. Previously exiled
opposition leaders returned to the country.
In the current elections, over 47 parties have registered candidates on
the ballet. Second, institutions have
been restored to their constitutionally guaranteed levels of power. The judiciary has been restored as an
independent, yet coequal, branch of government. Civilian oversight of the military has been formalized. Additionally, the president’s power to
dissolve the parliament unilaterally was revoked. Civil liberties, including
the right to protest freely, have largely been restored, and the parliament emphasizes
its commitment to being “of and by the people.”
Throughout the whole of Pakistan’s history, the current regime is on the
most positive democratic trajectory.
Linz
and Stepan’s consolidation conditions offer insight into Pakistan’s current
regime. In the current campaign cycle,
all contenders for power appear to have acted within the democratic
sphere. There is yet to be an attempt at
a non-democratic power grab, and the military has remained out of the political
sphere. Behaviorally, there is at least
the appearance of democratic preference on the part of political actors. Constitutionally, Pakistan appears to be
favoring democracy as well. Per the
constitution, the parliament was dissolved without incident in order to call
for elections, and a caretaker government was put in place. Members of the previous military dictatorship
have been impartially tried and persecuted for their actions under the
law. With few exceptions, both civilian
and military leaders have accepted their standing under the constitution.
A
measure of attitude, however, is more difficult and offers mixed results. Pakistani newspapers such as the International Tribune, Khelaaj Times, and Pakistan Today have conducted numerous electoral polls. These polls show diverse results – based on
income, education level, ethnicity, gender and generation – that one would
expect in an uncertain competitive democratic election. Results from these polls all showed an
election “too close to call,” generally positive indicator of successful
democratic consolidation. While such
polls appeared to point to an attitudinal preference for working within the
democratic system, they may have painted too rosy a picture of civil
society. Linz and Stepan assert that a
“lively and independent civil society”[6]
is necessary for democratic consolidation.
While political organization and differing opinions are certainly
indicative of democratic consolidation, the opinion polls failed to capture the
uptick in violence surrounding the political campaigns and dampening some of
the civil society effects. Over 50
people were killed while participating in campaign-related activities in the
month of April.[7] The Taliban has claimed responsibility for
most of the deaths and violence. While
not a recognized political or civic entity, the Taliban’s ability to recruit
and carry out extra-constitutional anti-democratic activities shows that there
is still a portion of the population who does not believe that democracy is the
best option. The Taliban may prove to be
the biggest challenge to Pakistan’s ability to consolidate.
Are
the Taliban-led actions enough to erode the otherwise positive indicators of
rule of law, state apparatus and economics in both civil and political
society? Now that elections have been
held, a few key indicators over the next several weeks may hold the
answer. First is the willingness of the
incumbent party to peacefully relinquish power.[8] The mechanics of a democratic transition have
yet to be successful in Pakistan. This
will test both constitutional and behavioral adherence to the democratic
principles of rule of law as a new ruling coalition with an ideological shift
takes place. Secondly, the military’s
willingness to continue to adhere to civilian oversight will also embody a
clear sign of success. During previous
attempts to hold democratic elections and consolidate a government, the
military has stepped in to authoritatively fill the power vacuum. Restraint in doing so this time is necessary
for Pakistan to continue along a positive trajectory towards democratic
consolidation. Additionally, the willingness
of civil society to accept the electoral outcome and use legal means to voice
opposition will be a key indicator. This
last indicator will provide the most comprehensive behavioral, attitudinal and
constitutional measures of the direction of civil society. Accepting the results as valid and final will
provide the attitudinal indicator, while voicing any opposition in a legal and
organized way provides both behavioral and constitutional indicators of a
preference for a democratic system. A
reversion to violent or extra-legal behavior, or a sharp rise in support for
the Taliban would counter these tendencies. Such non-democratic behavior would be
a sign of Pakistan eroding away from democratic consolidation.
At
present, Pakistan is far from any ideal-type of consolidated democracy. Its repeated history of erosion and
backsliding may be evidence of Adam Przeworski, Michael Alverez, Jose Cheibub
and Fernando Limongi’s assertion that attempting to study consolidated
democracies provides us with nothing but an “empty set.”[9] The current elections show a tendency towards
enduring democratic rule, at least in the short term. If it is to succeed, it will provide a new
case study for paths to consolidation. In contrast, if history is to repeat
itself, Pakistan will remain entrenched in the literature of eroding attempts
at transition.
[1] Andreas Schedler. 1998.
“What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy 9(2): 91-107.
[2] Schedler, 1998.
[3] Linz, Juan and Alfred
Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press.
[4] Linz and Stepan, 1996.
[5] Schedler, 1998.
[6] Linz and Stepan,
1996.
[7] Staff Writer. 2013.
“Pre-Election Violence Continues in Pakistan.” Al
Jazeera Newswire. April 29. Access at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/04/2013429144211458515.html
[8] Schedler, 1998.
[9] Przeworski, Adam;
Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 1996. “What Makes
Democracies Endure?,” Journal of Democracy, 7, pages 39-55.
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