Empowerment through fear

I am a risk taker.  I flew attack helicopters for a living.  I ice climb, mountain climb, and race my bike at ridiculous speeds on ridiculous roads because it's fun and relaxing.  I've moved across the country on my own no less than half a dozen times.  I've led delegations of congressmen into less than friendly countries where I speak minimal, if any, of the language.  I've slept outside through everything mother nature can throw at me.  And I'm ok with killing spiders.

I do, however, have my limits.  And limits come for various reasons.  Sometimes I'm not feeling 100%, sometimes my head and my heart just aren't into it that day, somethings make the hair on the back of my neck bristle in that "maybe you should just walk away" kind of way.

Yesterday, one of the other Combat Apathy ambassadors sent me this story about some canyon rope swing adventure gone not-so-right.  Yes, everyone was fine and the end.  And perhaps everyone had fun.  But, as the author of the commentary suggests, risks are meant to be experienced at a personal pace.

While I agree with generally everything the author has to say, I feel that she comes short of one of the primary issues surrounding risk takers - the respect and acceptance of fear.  Risk takers are not unnecessarily or recklessly fearless.  Those people don't live long enough to become risk takers.  Risk takers understand fear, respect fear, and need fear.  If you're not afraid, you don't understand the significance of risk, nor are you living up to your potential.  

Learning how to channel and develop fear is the strongest weapon an individual can possess.  The author argues that when faced with risk, "empowerment comes from taking that step ourselves."  Yes, it does, but that statement doesn't give credence to the entire process of empowerment.  

Risk taking is empowering.  And, inclusive of that, fear is empowering.  Fear, when used correctly, leads to respect.   Respect leads to knowledge.  Knowledge leads to strength and overcoming.  

I have been in situations similar to that of the women in the video.  I've had partners call me a "fucking chick" for just wanting to chill out for an afternoon and play around on some 5.8s rather than trying to crush myself on the 5.10b trad route for the 30th time in a row.  I've had fellow pilots mock me for pulling myself off a flight when I wasn't sure of my physical state.  Teammates have bristled when I couldn't make a race.  Understanding our moment to moment shortcomings and respecting our fears is true empowerment.  The days I spent climbing easier routes, or resting my body and mind were not easy.  It takes more courage to break from the peer pressure and stand up to your fears than go with the flow and pretend they don't exist. 

So, I challenge you all to respect your fears and face them.  Learn from them.  And lead them to empower you.  And, when you're ready, jump off the cliff.      

Academic Sampling Part 2...

And second... a memo on some of the prevailing literature's implication for anti-terrorism strategies. 

External vs. Internal Strategies in Combating Terrorism

            How is a terrorist defeated?  This question has been at the heart of debates and arguments between policy makers, military strategists, and academics for decades.  In the United States, the search for an answer has intensified in the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001.  America has fought a Global War on Terror (GWOT); tactics have been dressed up in a neat little package and called “Hearts and Minds Counterinsurgency” . There have been covert actions and overt shows of good will, and studies conducted on why terrorism works and how it is destined to fail. Arguments have been presented on the semantics of one man’s freedom fighter being another man’s terrorist.  Andrew Kydd and Barbra Walters’ “The Strategy of Terrorism” and Max Abrams’ “What Terrorists Really Want” seem to be two dichotomous and irreconcilable works, arguing for different motivations and strategic rationalities for terrorist behaviors. From each, therefore, comes a different recommendation for defeating terrorism.  However, taken together, the arguments give a more complete picture of terrorist motivation, and a broader insight on how to counter it.

            In looking at counter terrorism, it is important to differentiate between external and internal strategies.  External strategies focus on the big picture motivation of organizations, their choice of strategies, and the groups they target.  Countries targeted by terrorist organizations primarily use such strategies.  They focus on how to defeat the actions of a mature and strategic organization, which often exist outside the attacked country’s borders.  Internal strategies focus on the individuals that are drawn to terrorist organizations.  These approaches  are most often successfully employed by states combating domestic organizations.  They focus on breaking an organization before it forms, or preventing an established organization from carrying out successful attacks.  In summary, external anti-terrorism policies are concerned with an organization’s ultimate strategic goals, while internal approaches are concerned with individuals and internal workings of the organization.     

            Kydd and Walters argue for the rational actor theory in explaining the strategic logic of terrorism as a means of conveying a costly signal to a stronger adversary.  They propose that the success of a costly signal is due to one of five principle strategic logics: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding.[1]  The authors paint a picture of terrorist organizations being political goal-seekers (primary desires being regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control and status quo maintenance.[2]), and these strategies being the means to their end.  Understanding these strategic logics can aid in developing external counter terrorism strategies, as they give insights into why terrorists do what they do, and whom they attack.  Following from Kydd and Walters, external strategies should be focused on political (including military) actions.  These include the hardening of targets, targeted retaliation, partial concessions and even peace treaties.  The “clear” and “hold” phases of the “clear-hold-build” strategies also fall into this category, as targeted states work to physically regain territory held by terrorist groups.  Non-kinetically, states can also work to minimize the psychological effect of terrorists’ actions on their population, rendering their strategic logics ineffective.  These outwardly focused strategies, however, only address half the problem of combating terrorism.        

            Looking to Abrams’ descriptions of terrorist groups gives insight to the other side of the issue.  Abrams uses the Natural Systems model to explain the social reasoning for individuals to join a terrorist organizations.  He focuses primarily on the social networks and personal interactions that attract individuals to organizations.  Abrams stresses that there is often a disconnect between the official goals of an organization and the social goals governing the behavior of its members.[3]  Abrams’ insights can aid in developing internal counter terrorism strategies.  The natural systems model provides a deeper understanding of the psychology of why groups form, and the makeup of the individuals that comprise them.  Abrams focuses on the individual terrorist as a “social solidarity seeker.”[4]  This separates the individual from the group in terms of motivation and driving goals.  The natural systems model centers on the fact that terrorist organizations appeal to certain types of people – the socially alienated, those with friends or relatives already active in the organization, and/or those looking to be part of a group.  It therefore follows, that targeting these individuals and preventing them from joining organizations is the baseline for internal strategies.  Where external strategies and conducted primarily by political/military means, internal strategies are more often conducted by law enforcement and domestic political officials.  Strategies combating the internal side of terrorism include rigorous law enforcement profiling of vulnerable groups, driving a wedge between group members by rewarding persons for their cooperation with the government or law enforcement. The development and cultivation of double agents also further divides terrorist group members.  Such actions work to undermine the very solidary potential members are seeking when they look to join an organization.  Though there is not one universal terrorist “personality type,” the insights from Abrams’ findings on terrorists as social solidary seekers help to better understand the types of individuals susceptible to joining an organization. His surmises give a reasonable starting point for law enforcement efforts.  This inside-out approach presents the possibility for organizations to be stopped before they gather enough resources or momentum to conduct a successful attack.

            A war on terror cannot be fought by military might alone.  Though an important piece of the puzzle, it will not be successful unless the ties that bind organizations are undermined and broken.  The most recent example of this is seen in the 2006 surge in Iraq.  The increase in military troops combined with the Awakening movement inside Iraq worked to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) both externally and internally.  While US and coalition troops were working to tactically remove known AQI leaders and deny the organization territory, the Awakening movement undermined AQI’s social and psychological hold on the population.    

As shown, neither external nor internal strategies offer a complete counter to terrorism.  Rather, a two-pronged coordinated approach has the best potential for success.  This requires transparent communication and coordination between multiple actors and organizations.  Domestically, law enforcement, national policy makers, and potentially National Guard – level militaries must integrate their actions.  For attacks originating from a foreign organization, it means coordination between the target government’s political and military branches and the host country’s domestic law enforcement.  The efforts of such coordinated approach will be more fruitful than an individual strategy taken alone.  To defeat terrorism, it is important to look at seemingly opposing arguments, and discover their complimentary possibilities. 

             

              

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[1] Kyd and Walter 2006.

[2] Kydd and Walter 2006.

[3] Abrams 2008.

[4] Abrams 2008. 

An academic Sampling...

So I've had a few people as to post a few samples of my writing.  So here are two.  If, for whatever reason, you want to cite them for something, please just let me know and give me credit.

First... an article critique for your pleasure.

Article Critique of “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?”

            In 2012, five years after its completion, Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey Freidman, and Jacob Shapiro set out to examine the reason behind the effectiveness of the surge strategy employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In “Testing the Surge: Why did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?”, the authors argue a synergy thesis better explains the decline in violence in 2007 than a theory based on one action, event or tactic alone.  Central to this argument is debunking that neither the troop increase resulting from the surge nor the Awakening, in isolation, could have led to successful decline in violence brought about as a result of their simultaneous and complementary implementation.  They additionally set out to prove that the timing of the surge and the successful Awakening and Sons of Iraq (SOI) movement could not be epiphenomenal, as the events were necessarily and inextricably linked. 

            Biddle et al base their argument on evidence from the unclassified significant activities (SIGACTs) database for the timeframe from February 2004 – December 2008, and a collection of 70 interviews with US and Coalition officers who served in Iraq during the 2006-2008 surge campaign.  The SIGACTs database provides information on the location, date, time and nature of violence for instances involving the use of force by Coalition forces or Iraqi units that were reported to Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) headquarters.  The interviews focused on officers from the districts with the highest percentage of SIGACTs events in 2006, and were conducted both in person and via telephone.  The authors also used supplemental data on civilian and non-combat sectarian violence provided by Iraqi Body Count (IBC) to complete the picture provided by SIGACTs. 

            Methodologically, the authors use process tracing of the data to test four possible explanations as to why violence decreased in Iraq in 2007.  Three explanations – sectarian violence, the Awakening in isolation, and the surge in isolation – are all dismissed as being inaccurate explanations of violence reduction, and not supported by their evidence.  The fourth explanation, the Synergy Thesis, they argue best explains the drop in violence based on the evidence they have collected.  Boiled down to its basic definitions, the synergy thesis argues that the surge and the Awakening needed one another for success.  In comparing the four possible explanations, the authors ultimately assert that the synergy thesis is “the stronger fit with what we do know.”[1]

            The policy implications of the synergy thesis lead Biddle et al to warn practitioners to proceed with caution when evaluating a surge-type strategy in other counterinsurgency operations.  Their warning is aimed specifically at Afghanistan, where no movements analogous to the Awakening or SOI exist.  Similar warnings are attached to proposed impacts on military doctrine (caveating their findings as applicable primarily to ethnosectarian identity countries) and to the scholarship community.  Their findings on the synergy thesis can therefore hardly be called generalizable, despite containing valuable explanations for activities in a highly-politically and socially contentious conflict. 

            Examining Biddle et al’s methodology raises a few significant questions and concerns.  The first and most glaring of these, the limitations of the SIGACTs, the authors address themselves.  The database is accurate and objective, yet it limited to only those events involving coalition forces that have been reported to MNF-I and subsequently processed.  While a good and objective system, the realities of war are that no database recording system will ever be able to capture every kinetic event perpetrated on the battlefield.  The IBC data helps to augment this, however, it too is limited in scope to only those incidents reported to sources to which the organization has access.

            A more glaring concern is raised concerning the interviews.  The authors admit to the fact that any interview has the potential for unintended bias and is only as accurate as the subject is honest.  However, the validity of the interviews is not the primary concern.  The choice of subjects may have created biased and incomplete evidence.  All the subjects were US or Coalition officers who served in Iraq during the period in question.  These interviews provide a picture of the changes in coalition strategy, and the subsequent impact on their tactics and situation on the ground.  What is greatly lacking from the information captured in the interview is the Iraqi point of view.  The synergy thesis is based on the mutual necessity of the US-led surge tactics and the Iraqi-led Awakening and SOI movement.  And while the interviews capture the opinions and observations of the coalition leaders as to why the surge provided the necessary conditions for the Awakening to take hold, there is no direct account from Iraqis as to why they were able to successfully coalesce when they did.  One of the primary lynchpins of the synergy thesis is that the Awakening was successful due to fact that the increased presence of Coalition troops allowed for the physical security necessary for the Sunnis to organize into the Awakening and SOI.  Yet their account is based on US-centric reports.  It ignores other potential Iraqi particulars that may be unknown to coalition leaders.  The typical Coalition officer serving in Iraq between 2006-2008 spent on average 8 month (rarely exceeding one year) in Iraq.  Despite extensive training and a keen tactical and cultural awareness, there are factors that, in 6 months to a years time, cannot be fully understood, and may have been overlooked in the interviewees accounts.  Therefore, without the Iraqi reports, there is no way to rule out all the factors other than the surge that may have been primarily responsible for the success of the Awakening.    

            There are two important factors that that authors fail to address as possible contributors to the decrease in violence in 2007.  First, Biddle et al do not address the potential impact of the increased capability of the Iraqi forces working with the coalition.  Since 2004, coalition troops had been working with newly trained Iraqi soldiers to present a joint counterinsurgency effort.  By 2007, virtually all patrols and offensive operations conducted by US and Coalition forces were done as a joint effort with the Iraqi Army.  There is the possibility that the increased competency and ability of the Iraqi Army forces had a significant effect on the Iraqi confidence that the conditions were favorable for the Awakening and SOI movement.  The authors point to failed attempts by Coalition forces to ally with Sunni leaders in 2004-2006 as proof that the surge was pivotal in guaranteeing the protection from Al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) the Sunnis needed to ensure the Awakening succeeded.  They do not, however, control for the increase in Iraqi forces as contributing to the security of Sunnis.  Seeing Iraqi troops, their countrymen, protecting their home country, may have provided necessary motivation for Sunnis to break with and stand up to AQI insurgents. 

            Secondly, the authors do not take into account the effect that the increase of Joint Special Operations Command’s (JSOC) night raids had on bleeding AQI insurgent groups of their “middle management” operatives.  Though it can be argued that these operations were part of the surge strategy, their tactical effect cannot be lumped in with the increase of troop numbers addressed by the authors.  Furthermore, JSOC operates largely independently and on separate operational authority from conventional military forces, thus their tactics must be considered separately.  The authors do not address the possibility that success of so-called “snatch and grab” operations of ridding insurgent groups of their local tactical leaders contributed to the security situation and confidence of the Awakening and SOI leaders.    

            Biddle et al provide a significant contribution to the existing literature and theories on the reduction of violence in Iraq 2007 in that they provide an account of the particularly Iraqi conditions necessary for the synergy thesis to work.  However, they leave out large and potentially significant pieces of the puzzle when asserting the synergy thesis.  Their article does offer an evidence-based answer to the question “Why did Violence in Iraq Decline in 2007?”.  However, possibilities for other explanations still exist and must be controlled for to prove the complete accuracy and explanatory value of the synergy thesis.              

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[1] Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey Freidman, and Jacob Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security 37 #1 (Summer 2012), 7-40

Riding into the Ivory Tower

The past few years I have used bike racing as an escape from my life.  Bad day at the office? Intervals were a cure.  Unappreciated at work?  My teammates needed me for a leadout.  Frustrated with a feeling of spinning my wheels and going nowhere?  Well there's always a race this weekend.  

I've met incredible people racing my bike.  My best friends, the love of my life, kindred spirits and sisters from another mother.  The bike has given me an instant community wherever I've moved.  It has saved my life in my darkest times.  I love my bike, everything it represents.  

However as the 2013 season approaches, I feel much different than in the past few years.  Last year, I wanted nothing more than for race season to start because I needed something to validate me.  "Dear god get me out of the office and onto my bike" was all I could think.  And while I love my bike, and I've spent a solid winter training, as I approach this season, it is much different.  

First, I love my research.  I have a thesis topic that I want to dive into.  I am foregoing the first race of the Colorado calendar so I can spend my weekend crafting my research proposal.  

Second, I have found a home and a community in academia.  I have a director of the research center who was excited about my research as I was.  In the past two weeks I have been interviewed by  GQ, The New York Times, and the Korbel School's own media outlets about my work, past military life, and current research.  A year ago I dreamed of the covershot on velonews... today I geek out about op/eds being posted on political violence blogs and The Monkey Cage.  Last year I wanted the letters p-r-o affiliated with my name.  Today I want the letters p-h-d.  

Bicycle, I will always love you.  And I will treat every race with the respect it deserves and work my hardest to win.  But academia, you are my new home.  I can only hope that the past decade has prepared me for you.   

It takes an Outrage.

In 1992, thanks to outraged spurred by Anita Hill's accusations of then-nominee Clarence Thomas in front of a panel of male senators, a record-breaking 4 women were elected to the US Senate.  This unprecedented election led to the year being dubbed "The Year of the Woman."  20 years later, Congress had another record-breaking year for women, bringing the number in the Senate above 20 and in the House nearly 80.  In the London Olympics, the women of the United States won 29 medals, a count that would have put them in third overall if they were a country on their own.  A women was named CEO of Yahoo!, and a woman was awarded the Woodrow Wilson award for best book on politics and international affairs.  There is a woman as the Secretary of State, and driving in NASCAR.
However, tragically, it is not this positive news that has led many to call 2012 the "Next Year of the Woman."  All of these positive contributions and achievements were overshadowed by the controversy surrounding all things women this year.
Anne-Marie Slaughter wrote passionately that women can't have it all (something I already addressed), Congress repeatedly politicized women's reproductive rights, political candidates tried to legitimize rape, a young girl was shot in the face for going to school, the realities of gang-rape cover ups were thrust front and center in the US, India and throughout the world.  Oh yea, and Lance Armstrong's most egregious confession apparently centered on whether or not he called Betsy Andreu fat.
There has been little that has polarized the American public like the place and rights of women.  Suddenly everyone had an opinion.  Talk radio junkies called college students sluts and whores; the New York Times was concerned with the Secretary of State's hair; the DoD's announcement of the opening of Combat roles to women was met with jokes about PMS.
Throughout my life, I have had a bit of an involuntary adverse reaction to the term "feminism."  To me, it always seems academic, detached, and removed from the hardship and ugliness of reality.  It was the realm of those who studied "women's studies" but were afraid to venture outside the classroom.  The word for those who like to protest "egregious wrongs" but prefer to live in the comfort of their suburban bubble than take on the pain of the fight.  Feminism has become a water-downed term to make people who want to feel good about themselves able to do so without taking any risk.  It gives social and political clout without possibility of failure or loss.
For 2013, I hope we, as woman, can take on the challenge to return outrage-spurred action to feminism.  If 2012 was proposed to be the new Year of the Women due to the negative controversy surrounding women in the press, I hope 2013 can be the real Year of the Women due to action.
To launch my part in this, I am excited to have a part of Shannon Galpin's new endeavor, Combat Apathy.  Focused by the slogan "it takes an army," Combat Apathy is rooted in action.  It is rooted in outrage.  It is rooted in woman who have committed their lives to letting their doing doing the talking.  It is comprised on women who are not perfect, but defy the notion that they can't have it all; women who have been told to "reevaluate their life choices" and keep on living; women who fully embody the sacrifices they have made to pursue the life other only study as a social experiment.
Hillary Clinton famously coined the phrase "it takes a village".  For 2013, I propose that "it takes and outrage."  For every outrage produced by the media stories of 2012, let there be action in 2013.  Let the focus be on women doing, rather than women being pawns.  Let it be full of stories of the power of women in the political, athletic and academic arena.  Let us show what action outrage can spur, and make a real year of the women.  

Those who should, will

Secretary Panetta lifted the ban on women on combat roles.  The Washington Post calls this a "watershed policy change that was informed by women’s valor in Iraq and Afghanistan and that removes the remaining barrier to a fully inclusive military."

Given my time spent as an AH-1W pilot in the Marine Corps, my phone, email, Facebook, twitter, etc has been bombarded with questions about how I feel about this.  So rather than answer everyone individually, below, I wrap up all question and give my response. 

First, a disclaimer.  I am no longer in the Marine Corps.  The views, idea, feeling, rants, offensive comments, off color remarks, or general pissyness are mine and mine alone.  They do not reflect the the views of the Corps, or University of Denver.  So, with that aside, here I go. 

Historically, the central question of the women in combat debate has been “are women physically capable of performing the duties required for combat?” This question is quickly and easily answered.  Objectively, women are increasingly proving themselves as physically capable as men.  In both endurance events and tests of strength-to-weight, women are evening the playing field and living up to what has been thought of as “mens standards.”  Women have also proven themselves tactically as capable as men in all objectively measurable fields. 

If these objective standards – how fast one can run, how much one can lift, how well one can shoot – were the only indicators of success in combat there would be no argument or debate; those meeting the standard would be inarguably successful.  However, success in combat units is determined by more than just objective abilities, and thus the debate deepens. It is universally accepted that the safety and success of our military units is paramount.  It is for this reason that I believe the debate needs to shift away from “are women capable” of serving to “are women a value added”.   This changes the argument from “can or cannot” to “should or should not”; a question that needs to be addressed top-down rather than bottom-up. 

Throughout the last decade-plus of the United States’ involvement in the conflicts encompassing the Global War on Terror, there is no arguing that women have found themselves “in combat situations.”  In these situations, women have shown valor, strength, leadership, fortitude, and upheld the values of honor, courage and commitment.  Many have given the ultimate sacrifice, and each and every one of them deserves a place in history and our hearts as a true hero. 

But being “in combat situations” is not the same as being a “combatant.”  Combatants are offensive.  Their mission is to close with and destroy the enemy.  They seek engagement.  Their primary purpose is to assert superiority over an enemy force. 

Having the technical and tactical skill to react properly when coming under fire during the performance of primary duties – whether it be an ambushed logistics patrol, FET team patrol, or MP checkpoint attack – provides a foundation of knowledge and experience necessary for the argument supporting a woman’s ability to be in combat.  However, mastery of this baseline alone does not necessarily equate to success of a woman in the role of a combatant. 

Successful combat units are a product of the intangible – the fabled esprit de corps – as much as technical and tactical proficiency.  This elusive intangible cannot be “trained in” to a recruit.  It cannot be taught in infantry school.  No amount of extra pushups, remedial weapons training or nights in the field ensure that it exists. 

Women are just as capable as men of developing the necessary esprit de corps.  But it cannot be forced.  I hope that in implementing these changes, no arbitrary timelines are put in place.  If it takes 2 weeks, 2 months, 2 years or 2 decades for the right women to come into combat roles, so be it.  The US military is an all-volunteer force, and to respect that tradition, combat roles must be volunteer.  Quota systems will only set the work of every woman who has served back, by making light of the sacrifices involved in paving the paths they did.

I have the upmost trust that the DoD will set standards appropriately.  And I sincerely hope that the civilian oversight and general population will let this change grow organically and fruitfully, while respecting the grave responsibility for life given to each member of the US military. 

I can say from experience that the road for these women will not be easy.  I have chronicled much of my coming to grips with what my experience and service mean.  But I know that I, and all my sisters in arms, are more than capable to serve in all roles necessary for defense of this great nation.  Yet it will not be easy.  And hopefully the public will understand that in such a situation we all must be patient for the women who should emerge to lead our sons and daughters in arms, and not force them in their time.      

Calm in the Storm

I write as I am sitting between classes on my marathon day of Grad School.  I probably have some reading, some project, some something I should be doing to be a "good student."  But I need this hour to not completely fry my brain today.
I took on another job this week with Oceans Beyond Piracy, and organization I am beyond excited to be involved with.  I am still involved with Dr. Chenoweth's research, and taking a full-time load of classes.  And I recently had the privilege of becoming involved with Combat Apathy... but expect a full post on the awesomeness that is that in the near future.
And I am doing all I can to be supportive of Andy's bike shop endeavor, Golden's Newest hot spot, Rise Above Cycles.
Oh yea, and I'm trying to race my bike.

With all this going on, I have moments of thinking I'm biting off more than I can chew.  I have fears that I am not going to be a good student, researcher, employee, racer, partner, lover, friend.  I fear that my wide-eyed excitement of realizing that my experiences have positive and exciting implications for my professional future will lead me to isolation.

Especially around the new year, there is a lot of talk about balance.  About finding in in one's professional and personal endeavors, about shedding the negative, and "detoxifying" life choices.  The image most often associated with this is a quiet beach, or a flower, or a loan bird.
However, I prefer to think of is more like this:

I know I have taken on a lot.  But I also know that I have the strength to remain balanced.  For once I feel supported and confidant that going forward my decisions are wise.